This paper studies the e¤ects of accounting fraud on the product market. The model presented in this paper relies on the idea that a …rm's …nancial statements and actions must be consistent with each other. If the …rm is behaving fraudulently, insofar as its …nancial statements portray it as relatively e¢ cient, the …rm must act accordingly, i.e., increase its market share and/or reduce its prices. If the …rm does not behave in keeping with its fraudulent …nan-cials, the market would be able to identify the fraud. As such, the manager will take actions and make pricing decisions which are not optimal. These actions can have a signi…cant adverse e¤ect on social welfare. This paper utilizes the WorldCom case to illustrate the implications of such fraudulent behavior and its economic signi…cance in product markets.
Introduction
This paper develops a model in which a …rm that engages in accounting fraud will a¤ect the whole industry and social welfare as well. The hypothesis advanced in the paper is that …rms'actions and pricing/output decisions must be consistent with what they report in their …nancial statements.
For instance, if a …rm in a competitive industry were to portray itself as the most e¢ cient, i.e., having the highest pro…ts and lowest operating costs, it must be able to o¤er a lower price and/or increase its quantities (market share) compared to its competitors, 1 otherwise, the fraud would be revealed. When a …rm has a competitive advantage, the market expects the …rm to exploit it with the purpose of increasing its market share and pro…ts. Were the management not to exploit the …rm's competitive advantage, the board and shareholders would be concerned and would inquire about the management actions. Such inquiries might also reveal the fraud. Alternatively, an alert investor and/or the SEC or other regulatory agency might use the apparent inconsistency to uncover the fraud. In sum, since managers engaged in fraud wish to avoid detection, the decision to commit fraud becomes a joint, simultaneous decision to commit fraud and distort real actions.
The existing literature on accounting fraud focuses on …nancial markets and corporate governance (see e.g., Agrawal, Ja¤e, and Karpo¤ (1999) , , Gerety and Lehn (1997) , Kane (2004) , Miller (2003) , and Ronen (2002) ). The major concern addressed by this line of literature is that accounting fraud leads to ine¢ cient pricing of debt and equity because it generates unrealistic expectations. This literature …nds that accounting fraud has a signi…cant e¤ect on …nancial markets. False …nancial reporting can result in overpriced securities and overborrowing by a …rm. Since most debt contracts are based on accounting …gures, manipulating these …gures would help …rms avoid bankruptcy and/or take on additional low-interest debt at the expense of the debt holders. For this reason, enforcing accounting rules and preventing fraud are extremely important in sustaining a viable …nancial system. While the literature extensively studies the e¤ects of fraud on …nancial markets, it neglects to study the e¤ects of fraud on the product market. 2 Since a fraudulent …rm will act in a non-optimal manner, accounting fraud is bound to a¤ect the other …rms in the industry. Unless the products 1 It is also possible that the sales force would o¤er or the market would demand lower prices. In this case, managers would not initiate the adverse pricing and/or output choices, but they would be powerless to avoid them.
2 For more on the e¤ect of …nancial reporting on product markets see Bushman and Smith (2001) and Sadka (2004 Sadka ( , 2005 .
economy. The total social welfare implications of accounting fraud on the product market are thus the sum of the e¤ects on industry pro…ts and the e¤ects on consumer welfare. This paper shows that accounting fraud has an overall adverse e¤ect on the industry, even when taking into account the short-term bene…ts to consumers and ignoring the long-term adverse e¤ects. This real cost in product markets adds to the known costs of accounting fraud in …nancial markets.
The model developed in this paper contributes to the understanding of the real e¤ects of accounting and …nancial fraud. 5 In terms of asset prices, fraud has only a distributional e¤ect. While some investors bene…t from the stock price incline, the investors who bought the …rm's securities at an unrealistically high price before it drops will have lost. In this sense, fraud is not thought to a¤ect cash ‡ows. 6 For example, if an expense is merely capitalized fraudulently, it will eventually be depreciated (expensed) and will have no impact on overall cash ‡ows or overall pro…ts. In contrast, this paper demonstrates that fraudulently capitalizing expenses can result in non-optimal pricing, which will result in real e¤ects on the …rm, its industry and consumers.
The paper also analyzes a recent example to test the implications of the theory. Speci…cally, this paper explores the e¤ects of the accounting irregularities at WorldCom Inc. (henceforth WC) on the telecommunication market in the US during the fraud period 2000-2001. 7 The WC case is a good test case for several reasons. First, it is one of the largest frauds ever discovered. Second, this …rm is a major player in the telecommunication industry and is relatively undiversi…ed. Since the …rm is not diversi…ed, it is easier to test the implications on its product market. Third, it has a small number of signi…cant competitors, i.e., Sprint 8 and AT&T (henceforth ATT), which together control more than 60% of the market. Finally, all three major competitors in the market are publicly traded and thus must provide …nancial statements to the public.
This case is consistent with the theoretical analysis. During the period of fraudulent accounting, WC increased its market share in most of its markets compared to ATT and Sprint. In addition, WC also reported good operating results during this period. The restated results, however, are very poor. The …rm's true performance during this time period was much lower than the performance of the rest of the industry. After the fraud was discovered in 2002, WC's 2003 sales declined by much more than did the sales of its competitors. This result supports the hypothesis that 5 See also Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) . 6 Excluding tax implications, e.g., . 7 See, e.g., Sidak (2003 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a model to illustrate the e¤ects of …nancial-reporting fraud on the product market, pro…tability and consumer surplus. It also provides testable empirical predictions. Section 3 provides empirical evidence from the case of WorldCom accounting fraud. Section 4 brie ‡y discusses the generalizability of the results and other considerations. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The model is designed to identify the economic consequences of false disclosure on the product market. The model elicits the sources of ine¢ ciencies generated by the untruthful disclosure, such as ine¢ cient prices and quantities. As discussed above, in cases of fraud, these ine¢ cient allocations could come about due to management's desire to avoid detection. Management's actions must be consistent with the …nancial statements, or else the fraud will be detected immediately and the management penalized. What follows describes the model setup and some of its key assumptions.
Assume a price-taking competitive economy with n + 1 …rms. 9 Also assume a linear demand function, P = A BQ. To simplify the analysis, the model will concentrate on a single …rm's choice to provide false disclosure, denoted as Firm 1. In this basic model, the manager receives a cash amount equal to a portion, , of the reported pro…ts D 1 , where D i denotes …rm i's reported pro…ts. The …rm has n competitors, which are all identical and possess the following cost function: C i (q i ) = q 2 i . While the …rm's competitors are all identical, Firm 1 can be more e¢ cient with probability 1 , i.e., the …rm's cost function is C 1 (q 1 ) = q 2 1 with probability 1 and C 1 (q 1 ) = q 2 1 with probability 1 1 , where < . This cost-function distribution is common knowledge, however, only the managers of Firm 1 can know the true cost. Because this paper concentrates on the e¤ects of false disclosure, assume that Firm 1 draws as its marginal cost. 10 9 The price-taking competition was chosen to re ‡ect the price war in the telecommunications industry during the 2000-2001 period. In the late 90s it was clear that ATT lost its …rst mover's advantage, and that it therefore had to act competitively. 1 0 The speci…c fraud (capitalizing fees to telecom providers) and the aggressive price competition employed by WC implies that the fraud in ‡uenced the perception of the marginal cost parameter and not the …rm's average cost.
Assumption 1 : If the manager chooses to disclose falsely, she must commit to it for T periods.
This assumption is made to ensure the model's relation with accounting practices. Any sudden change in accounting practice and recognition would alert the market to the fraudulent reports made in the previous period. Thus, the manager must commit to consistently disclose falsely.
A possible example is the capitalization of costs that should be expensed (e.g., WorldCom). Such untruthful disclosure would result in lower reported cost, higher reported pro…ts, and would require the manager to commit to such accounting practice until the asset was completely amortized and there were no more such costs.
Assumption 2 : At the beginning of period T + 1, the …rm is liquidated and the remaining cash is distributed among its owners. (This assumption is relaxed in Section 4.2.1.)
Assumption 3 : At any period t T , the market can detect the fraud with probability 2 . 11
If the manager is caught, her employment will be terminated and she will be penalized with a constant exogenous amount k. 12 (The model will later identify the level of penalty which would eliminate the incentive for false disclosure. This assumption is valid only when there are no clear indications of false reporting, e.g., discrepancies between the …rm's reporting and its actions).
Assumption 4 : In this model, given the demand and cost function, it is possible that more e¢ cient …rms can be less pro…table than the ine¢ cient …rms. To exclude such cases from our analysis it is su¢ cient to assume that n > = . This assumption is important because without it there are no incentives to commit fraud. When the …rm portrays itself as more e¢ cient, it will show lower pro…ts.
Assumption 5 : The publicly available information includes the reported pro…t, reported cost, prices, quantities, and the type of competition. The reported cost is given prior to the simultaneous quantity choices of the …rms in the economy. These assumptions are descriptive. The major source of publicly available information for competitors and owners is the …rm's …nancial disclosure. The latter assumption is given for simplicity; it only a¤ects the quantity choices in the …rst period. 1 1 The model does not take into consideration the role of auditors although public …nancial statements are audited each year. However, the model implicitly includes auditors, internal auditors, and other market participants such as the SEC who enforce truthful disclosure. The basic model assumes that the manager has a probability 2 of getting caught during each period. Skillful auditing can increase this probability and reduce the number of frauds perpetrated in the market. When the auditors are involved in the fraud, however, the probability of their getting caught is very low, and the expected bene…t of fraud is higher. 1 2 This penalty can include prison, monetary sanctions, or any other forms of …nancial or non-…nancial penalties.
The manager's incentives to falsely report are imperative in this study. The manager is required to control the reported information and have a compensation scheme which is a function of her reports. This assumption re ‡ects the fact that managers are responsible for …nancial reporting and that much of their compensation is a function of their reported outcome. 13 In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, the manager is assumed to have no time preference.
At this point, it is important to note that while this model is a general one, it has some particular aspects which re ‡ect certain industries. For instance, the price-taking competition is meant to re ‡ect the telecommunications industry during the fraud period. In addition, the fraud choice, i.e., reporting a lower cost than the actual, re ‡ects the WC fraud. However, these assumptions do not To analyze this model, some additional notation is necessary. Let i;t and F i;t denote the true pro…ts of …rm i at period t when the manager of Firm 1 chooses not to commit fraud and when she chooses to commit fraud, respectively. Let D i;t and DF i;t denote the reported pro…ts of …rm i at period t when the manager of Firm 1 chooses not to commit fraud and when he chooses to commit fraud, respectively. Note that i;t = D i;t for all i, and F i;t = DF i;t for all i 6 = 1. Finally, denote consumer surplus and social welfare as cs t and sw t . Since the reported pro…ts, true pro…ts, consumer surplus and social welfare do not vary over time, the time subscript (t) is deleted in the analysis.
Lemma 1
The quantity choices of any …rm must be consistent with its disclosure (marginal cost, and pro…ts).
Proof. In the price-taking model described above, there is a one-to-one relation between the cost function and the quantity choice, q i = P= (2 ), where equals or , as the case may be (see Appendix). Thus, the …rm's choice of quantity would reveal the "true" marginal cost parameter.
Equivalently, in this model, the "true" pro…ts would also reveal the true marginal cost parameter ( ). The pro…t function is a function of the product price (P ) and , that is i = P 2 =4 (see Appendix). Since prices are observable, pro…ts would reveal .
This result is important because it provides the basis for the relation between accounting fraud and product markets. The economic consequences of untruthful disclosure depend on the e¤ects of untruthful disclosure on the …rm's actions. Lemma 1 claims that the …rm's action must be in accordance with its reports, otherwise the untruthful disclosure would be detected in the short-run and the manager would be penalized. 14 This result holds for any weakly-increasing cost function, when the competitive game, prices and output are observable.
The economic consequences of accounting fraud in product markets are a result of enforcement insofar as enforcement forces the manager to act according to her reports in order to avoid detection, which would then be followed by an enforcement action (penalty). Take away enforcement (the penalty) and fraud will have no consequences in the product market. To sustain a viable …nancial system it is necessary to have …nancial reports, and to have accounting rules enforced as well.
Therefore, one of the costs associated with the reporting requirements of …nancial markets and with their enforcement is that of the e¤ects of fraud, because enforcement makes …nancial statements credible and forces fraudulent management to act consistently with its reports to avoid detection.
Corollary 1
The quantity choices of the competing …rms are consistent with Firm 1's …nancial statements and are independent of the market's and competitors' perceptions of their reliability.
Proof. This result follows directly from Lemma 1. Each …rm chooses its quantities based on the price in the economy q i = P= (2 ) (see Appendix). The equilibrium price is a function of …rms' quantity choices. Since Firm 1 chooses its output based on its reported costs, the equilibrium price will be consistent with its reported cost. The competing …rms, therefore, choose their output based on the reported cost function of Firm 1, and not the true cost. The competing …rms decide on their output and pricing independently of the competing …rms'beliefs about the true cost function of Firm 1. 1 4 The model assumes that the managers understand that their actions and the …nancial statements must be consistent. However, it is possible that the e¤ects on the product market were generated by either the market or other employees. For instance, the sales force can observe the high margins and reduce prices to increase market share and sales. Alternatively, the market can observe the high margins and consumers will allocate themselves to the more e¢ cient …rm, while driving down the price. This important result follows directly from Lemma 1. Since the fraudulent …rm is forced to act according to its …nancial statements, the other competing …rms are inevitably a¤ected. This result holds for any competitive game in which Lemma 1 holds and the output or pricing choices of any …rm depend on the output choices of its competitors, e.g., Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2 If the fraud is not detected by the end of period T , it will be detected at period T + 1.
Proof. Lemma 2 follows directly from Lemma 1. The actual pro…ts are lower than the reported ones when a manager chooses to report falsely (i.e., to overstate the pro…ts). Therefore, when the …rm is liquidated, its remaining cash will re ‡ect the actual lower pro…ts of previous periods. Hence, the true cost function during these periods will be revealed.
Lemma 2 is an intuitive result. Accounting earnings must turn into cash ‡ow and dividends over time. It is not possible to inde…nitely report higher pro…ts with low cash ‡ows and low dividends.
Unless it does not have an e¤ect on the true pro…tability of the …rm, untruthful disclosure will eventually be detected.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique level of the penalty (denoted by k ) such that for every k k the manager will choose not to commit fraud, where:
Proof. See Appendix.
This result shows that, in equilibrium with k<k , a manager may choose to disclose untruthfully. 15 The above expression is produced under the assumption that the manager is risk neutral and there is zero discount rate. These assumptions are not necessary, however; they merely simplify the model. Generally, including higher discount factors would result in higher k and higher risk aversion would result in lower k . 16
The E¤ect of Accounting Fraud on the Product Market
This section focuses on analyzing the consequences of accounting fraud on the product market.
Before proceeding, it is important to recap what we have previously proven. The nature of the competition requires the manager to act in accordance with her …nancial reports, even when this will result in suboptimal allocations. These ine¢ cient quantity choices will also a¤ect the competing …rms, regardless of their beliefs about the true cost function of Firm 1. Since the manager of Firm 1 must choose an output based on her …nancial reports, the competing …rms will choose their quantities e¢ ciently given the disclosed cost.
The e¤ect on the product market can be broken down into three e¤ects: Firm 1's pro…tability, the competing (n) …rms'pro…tability, and consumer surplus.
Lemma 3
The di¤ erence between the true pro…tability of Firm 1 in the case of false disclosure versus truthful disclosure in any period t T , is
The di¤ erence between the pro…ts of the other competitors in the case of false disclosure versus truthful disclosure in any period t T , n 2 = n F 2 2 , is
The di¤ erence in consumer surplus due to the lower equilibrium prices in the case of false disclosure versus truthful disclosure in any period t T , cs, is
Equation (5) summarizes the social cost of accounting fraud with respect to the product market. The sub-optimal quantity choices will a¤ect industry pro…ts. Moreover, Firm 1's untruthful disclosure and ine¢ cient quantity choices will a¤ect the entire market, including consumers who will be a¤ected by price variations.
Proposition 2 Firm 1 has lower true pro…ts when its managers chooses to report false …nancial statements than when they report the truth, i.e., 1 < 0, its reported pro…ts are higher than the pro…ts without fraud, DF 1 > 1 , and thus, its reported pro…ts under fraud are higher than their
Proposition 2 is a result of the suboptimal actions undertaken by the fraudulent …rm. Since the manager commits to acting consistently with her …nancial reporting, the …rm su¤ers a decline in pro…tability. 17 This result is especially strong in price-taking competition because of marginal cost pricing. In this case, Firm 1 sells products for a price lower than its marginal cost. However, the …rm's pro…ts are negative only when the …rm is "pretending" to be much more e¢ cient than its competitors, i.e., 2 < 0. Speci…cally, ignoring …xed costs, Firm 1 will have zero (negative)
pro…ts if it acts as if its cost parameter is half (less than half) of the industry's cost parameter.
Proposition 3 The pro…ts of the other (n) …rms in the industry are lower and consumer surplus is higher than they otherwise would be without fraud, 2 < 0, cs > 0.
In sum, this model illustrates the negative e¤ects of fraud on the product market. It shows the e¤ects on the fraudulent …rm's performance, the performance of its competitors and the change in the e¤ects on consumer surplus. The overall social welfare implications of accounting fraud are the sum of the above implications.
Lemma 4 Accounting fraud has a negative e¤ ect on social welfare, i.e., sw < 0.
Proof. Note that in a competitive, price-taking competition, the equilibrium under truthful reporting maximizes social welfare (the First Optimality Theorem of the Welfare Economics).
Therefore, since the fraud equilibrium varies from this …rst-best equilibrium, fraud has a negative e¤ect on social welfare.
Testable Implications
The model above provides some empirical predictions about the e¤ects of accounting fraud on the product market. First, the model predicts that the fraudulent …rm will perform according to its reported productivity -i.e., if the …rm states in its …nancial reports that it has very low costs (relative to its competitors), then the …rm's market share should increase. Note that since the …rm is not truly as e¢ cient as it claims, the …rm should be producing less or the same rather than more relative to its competitors. Second, since the …rm had been acting suboptimally during the fraud period, after the fraud is discovered its market share will decline. Finally, the …rm's true performance (the restated performance) can be expected to be much lower than that of its competitors.
The empirical predictions above allow for changing aggregate demands and supply. When the demand and supply remain constant, the model has more empirical implications and predicts that the quantities in the industry will increase and that prices will fall. Since demand and supply rarely remain constant through time, however, it is unlikely that these implications can easily be tested.
The testable hypotheses in this paper are highly sensitive to the industry, the fraud, and the properties of accounting …gures (see Section 4). The model also requires intent, i.e., the manager must willfully and knowingly engage in the fraudulent behavior. As such, this paper does not deal with general restatements, which might simply represent honest mistakes. Therefore, this paper does not empirically test the hypotheses in the paper. Instead, the paper utilizes a case study as an example for the implications of accounting fraud in product markets.
3 The Case of WorldCom Inc.
This section uses a speci…c US example from the telecommunication industry to illustrate the possible adverse e¤ects of an accounting fraud on the product market. 18
Data
This paper utilizes several data sources on the telecommunications industry and on the three …rms, i.e., WC, Sprint, and ATT. The paper uses data from WRDS and EDGAR for the …nancial 
Background
WC was a US-based international telecommunications service provider. 19 At the time of the scandal, WC's business segments included: data service, Internet-related services, commercial longdistance and local voice services, international communications services and designing and managing customers' communications systems. The data services included frame relay, ATMs and IP networks. The Internet services included high-speed connections, Web-site management, etc.
The WC group included MCI, which provided wholesale data services, wireless messaging, dial-up Internet access and consumer long-distance and local voice services.
The Accounting Scandal
In June 2002, it became apparent that WC had overstated EBITDA by fraudulently capitalizing its expenses. This was the largest accounting scandal that had been committed in the US to date. 
Empirical Evidence
This to its major competitor WC seemed to be doing very well. However, the restated results showed losses for WC; the true margins were much lower than those of the pre-fraud period.
An analysis of the pre-and post-fraud periods suggests that WC was struggling due to ine¢ cient pricing and/or quantity choices rather than an ine¢ cient organization. In the post-fraud period, Aliant kept a constant margin (38%) during the fraud period. The Canadian …rms provide evidence that the e¤ects on the industry margins were not part of an overall trend in telecommunications industries around the world. The US telecommunications industry was adversely a¤ected by the "ine¢ cient" pricing of WC.
Some Additional Anecdotal Evidence
There is much more anecdotal evidence beyond the data shown in Figure 1 and WC was straining the industry.
The evidence and the analysis in this paper are consistent with the conclusions of Sidak (2003), who concludes that WC's fraudulent …nancial reports distorted the economic gains of acquiring new customers, and caused other …rms to spend too much to do the same. Sidak also quotes
William Esrey, the CEO of Sprint, saying that WC's fraud led the industry to "unsustainably" low prices. Sidak develops the hypothesis that WC's management engaged in a strategy of ine¢ ciency in order to hurt its competitors, and manipulated the accounting numbers to avoid detection while exploiting the bene…ts. However, WC did not in fact bene…t. The predatory strategy was not optimal for WC and the managers could have bene…ted even more had they simply manipulated the accounting pro…ts. Therefore, in contrast to Sidak (2003) , this paper develops the theory that the fraud caused the non-optimal strategy and not vice versa. The managers manipulated the accounting numbers to extract rents, and adopted a consistent strategy to avoid detection. Sadka (2004 Sadka ( , 2005 
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The Restated (Real) WorldCom Performance
This section tests the following two empirical predictions of the model: that a fraudulent company's true performance is much worse than the industry's performance, and that the post-fraud performance (in terms of market share) is low. To test the …rst of these predictions, Figure 2 plots the restated operating income excluding depreciation and amortization. As shown in the …gure, the actual performance of WC is very poor during the fraud period: in 2001 and 2002, the …rm recorded a substantial loss. The low performance is expected since WC had not been choosing its actions and pricing decisions optimally. The operating performance is also much lower than the performance of ATT and Sprint, both of which were pro…table. The 2000 -2001 results might be overstating the extent of the poor performance due to goodwill and other asset write-o¤s, however, excluding these expenses still reveals a sharp decline in pro…tability for WC during the fraud period.
Similarly, if the …rm's actions were not optimal and it had produced too much, in the period following the discovery of the fraud, the …rm would have to reduce its market share. Consistent with this hypothesis, the sales growth of the …rms in the industry was -7%, -9%, and -15% for Sprint, ATT, and WC (named MCI during this period), respectively. Note that due to government assistance the decline in sales was much lower than what it otherwise would have been. For example, the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of Defense, and other federal agencies supported MCI after it went bankrupt. In addition, after WC …led for bankruptcy, its revenues from various federal contracts grew by approximately $270 million. Without these government contracts, it is not clear whether WC (whose name changed to MCI after …ling for bankruptcy)
could have been revived as easily.
Bankruptcies are generally associated with declines in market share, however, in the general case, the bankrupt …rm experiences a decline in market share prior to the Chapter 11 …ling. In contrast, WC was increasing its market share prior to its declaration of bankruptcy. It was only after the fraud was discovered and WC …led for Chapter 11 that WC experienced a decline in market share. Moreover, the bankruptcy was not associated with a major restructuring of the business model of WC, but rather of its debt. This analysis implies that although the bankruptcy was one of the causes for the decline in market share, it does not seem to be the only reason for it.
This decline is likely associated with the …rm's choosing its proper (optimal) prices and output.
Estimating the Social Welfare Costs in the Interstate Toll Services
This section provides a crude estimate of the costs of accounting fraud. The results in Table 2 are not meant to capture the exact cost to the economy due to the WC fraud, but to illustrate the economic magnitude of the cost that such fraud can in ‡ict on an industry. Moreover, this section can illustrate the magnitude of the e¤ect on each of the market participants, i.e., consumers, competitors, and the fraudulent …rm.
This paper utilizes FCC data to estimate the parameters of the demand curve and attempts to analyze the costs of fraud in the telecommunications industry. In order to estimate the demand parameters during the period 2000-2001, assume that during this period demand is constant and that price and quantity vary due to supply-curve variation. This assumption is plausible because the supply curve is expected to vary due to the lower reported costs. Also, prices fell and quantities increased, which is consistent with an increase in supply rather than a change in demand. If the demand declined (increased) prices should have declined (increased) and quantities should have declined (increased) as well, which did not occur: instead, prices declined and output increased.
Therefore, even if the demand had changed, the change was fairly insigni…cant in comparison to the change in supply.
Since the marginal cost of a call is zero, the analysis would de…ne quantities as households.
This de…nition of quantity is consistent with the trend in the industry to o¤er calling packages with unlimited calls. According to the FCC's Study on Telephone Trends (2004) 
to get A 313 and B 0:08 10 6 . These estimates seem reasonable. The …rst household to use telecommunications services would probably be willing to pay up to $300. Given the price in the economy and the number of households, B is expected to be very small. 29 Apart from the demand parameter, the model requires two more additional variables, n (number of …rms) and , in order to assess the consequences in the product market. The Paul Budde
Telecommunication in the United States of America report identi…es 6 major competitors for WC:
ATT, Sprint, Qwest, IDT, Global Crossing, and other small …rms. Therefore, assume that n = 6.
An estimate for is more di¢ cult to obtain. It is clear that the cost parameter is very small. First, the marginal cost of the …rst family is likely to be extremely low. The marginal cost is expected to rise with quantity due to customer retention costs and costs aimed at obtaining new subscribers.
The costs of obtaining new subscribers is low for the …rst subscribers, however, when the number of subscribers and users is already high and many households are already subscribed, it is very costly to obtain an additional subscription. The data 30 suggest that 1 10 4 10 7 . For the illustration in Table 2 , assume that = 0:00001. The e¤ects of the fraud on the product market are higher as decreases.
2 8 The prices and quantities data from the FCC is also consistent with the model. The prices in the industry fell and quantities increased. 2 9 It is possible to use a more sophisticated method of estimating demand, but for the purposes of this study it is unneccesary. 3 0 The prices and quantities data are from the FCC report. Table 2 reports the calibrated numbers of Equations (2)- (5) for di¤erent values of (the reported cost parameter of WC). The results are consistent with the empirical …ndings. When = 1:75 10 6 , the cost of fraud to WC is estimated to be approximately $49 billion, which is equal to its restated operating loss excluding depreciation for the year 2000. Yet, the e¤ects of the fraud on the other …rms in the industry does not seem very large. This result is also consistent with the empirical evidence, as ATT and Sprint do not seem to experience a sharp pro…tability decline during the fraud period. The short-term bene…ts to consumers do not seem very large either. The overall e¤ect of fraud on the product market is on the other hand, very large. It is much stronger than the positive e¤ect on consumer welfare. For instance, for = 7 10 6 , WC is expected to lose $49 billion, the competing …rms are expected to lose about $500 million, and consumers are expected to bene…t about $800 million, such that the overall negative e¤ect of the fraud on social
welfare is approximately $49 billion. This cost is economically signi…cant relative to the size and value of the industry. Note that these estimated costs are annual. The longer the fraud period, the higher the social cost. 31 The high costs incurred by WC are due to the competition model and the quadratic cost function. WC was increasing its market share and quantities, q 1 . At the same time, prices fell.
Since the marginal cost function is increasing, mc 1 = 2 q 1 , 32 WC is producing more at higher costs and selling at a lower price. On the other hand, its competitors are adjusting their quantities according to market prices and their own costs. Table 2 . It seems that the e¤ects on competitors are insigni…cant compared to the e¤ects on the fraudulent …rm. 33 3 1 While this analysis might be overstating the costs of fraud due to asset write-o¤s made by WC in 2000 and 2001, the inferences do not change if these expenses are excluded. The goal of this illustration is to point out the relative impact on the di¤erent market participants (consumers, competitors, and the fraudulent …rm) and not to estimate precisely the cost of fraud. 3 2 While WC reported as its marginal cost parameter, its true cost was . 3 3 This result is speci…c to the competitive model and cannot be generalized.
Can Alternative Hypotheses Explain the Results?
The WC case has been studied by others as well (e.g., Sidak (2003) ). This paper di¤ers from previous work in terms of its interpretation. In order to provide more support for the model, it is necessary to explore some additional alternative explanations.
An obvious alternative interpretation of the results is that the management of WC simply chose a bad strategy and production process and covered for their incompetence by falsifying the …nancial statements. However, there are several strong arguments against this theory. First, the management knew the true performance. Therefore, they could have simply changed their strategy or production process. Note that the fraud occurred over several periods. It is possible that the managers …rst chose a poor strategy and when the poor results were apparent, falsi…ed the …nancial statements to avoid showing the poor results. But in this case one would expect the management, which would now be aware of the ‡aws in their strategy, to change their strategy. Yet, WC's management did not change its strategy, which they knew to be faulty. Moreover, granting that management was willing to falsify the …nancial statements, they would have been even better o¤ by choosing a better production process or strategy and falsifying the reports so as to show even better performance. So even if poor strategy had generated the fraud, at some point the fraud made the poor strategy persist. The second drawback to this alternative interpretation is that it is inconsistent with WC's true performance and actions. Speci…cally, if WC were truly less e¢ cient than its competitors, then it should have reduced its market share and/or increased prices. In fact, however, WC increased its market share and reduced prices.
A second possible interpretation for the results is that WC chose a strategy meant to hurt its competition (e.g., Sidak (2003) ). This hypothesis is not consistent with the data. It seems that WC was doing itself more damage than it was to any of its competitors. While WC's true operating performance was very poor, the rest of the industry did not seem to be as strongly a¤ected. In addition, the goal of such a strategy would be to deter entry (promote exit), but WC was providing the FCC with faulty optimistic growth projections that caused over-investment and entry in the industry. If the goal of WC was to deter entry, their growth projections would have been overly pessimistic rather than optimistic.
The third alternative interpretation is that WC was pricing low so as to attract consumers in the short-run. This hypothesis is also not consistent with industry trends. First, if such a strategy was good for WC, it should have been good for all the …rms in the industry. However, other …rms in the industry did not choose such a strategy. Moreover, this strategy would only work if consumers faced high switching costs. Otherwise, the increase in subscribers would be short-lived and subscribers would change providers when prices adjusted back to their equilibrium level. The e¤ect of WC's bankruptcy and fraud discovery on the market share of WC suggests that consumers did not face high switching costs. Therefore, it is di¢ cult to justify such a strategy. In general, if the managers truly believed their chosen strategy was optimal for the …rm in the long-run, it is di¢ cult to imagine the use of fraud to conceal poor short-run performance.
The analysis above suggests that it is di¢ cult to justify WC's actions as a strategy chosen by the management to better the …rm. In addition, the speci…cs of the case also suggest that the strategy was more likely meant to bene…t its managers than its stakeholders. WC's CEO received loans totalling over $400 million during the fraud period. By November 2000, the CEO should have known that he would not be able to repay the loans, yet he sought and accepted new loans.
In addition, the rate on these loans was far below the commercial rate, and in 2002, he provided misleading documents to the compensation committee suggesting he had su¢ cient assets to cover the loans. These actions constituted a breach of the CEO's duties of loyalty and good faith.
In sum, the only apparent di¤erence between the fraud period and the pre-and post-fraud period is the fraud. WC was performing well (relative to its industry) in both the pre-and postfraud period. The …rm did not seem to change its …rm organization or production process during that period. In fact, after the fraud was discovered and WC …led for bankruptcy, it did not change its …rm organization or production process. Therefore, it is unlikely that WC's results are due to ine¢ cient …rm organization. Moreover, since WC did not improve its productivity, it is not otherwise clear why it reduced its prices and increased its market share.
Generalizability and Additional Considerations 4.1 Generalizability
This paper concentrates on a speci…c case in US history to study the e¤ects of accounting fraud on the product market. As in any such case study, there is a concern regarding the generalizability of the results to other cases. While this study is speci…c, its major results can be generalized to other cases i.e., accounting fraud has a signi…cant impact on the product market if the following three conditions hold:
1. Economically Signi…cant Fraud : The fraud must be economically signi…cant. Hence, the analysis does not apply to any earnings management but rather to signi…cant frauds. If the …rm's management decides to shift income from one period to the other, the managed amount must be signi…cant enough so that the …rm appears to be more or less e¢ cient than it really is. Financial reporting provides a noisy measure of the …rm's cost function. Since accounting measures are noisy, the market discounts the information. Therefore, to change the market perception of the …rm's e¢ ciency the fraud must be su¢ ciently large. To illustrate this point more formally, assume that the …rm's cost parameter, , is distributed normally, N ; 2 . Also assume that …nancial reporting, denoted as y, provides a noisy measure of the cost parameter, i.e., y = + ", where " N 0; 2 " and " is independent of . Thus, the conditional expectation of given y, is
The model in the paper requires the manager to act as if her …rm is more e¢ cient than it is, because otherwise the market would be able to detect the fraud. However, when (y ) is small, the market would not change its priors about the …rm's cost parameter. In such cases, the manager can act optimally and still avoid detection.
Financial Statements Are Informative:
The second condition requires …nancial statements to provide information about the …rm's cost function and/or productivity. For instance, without segment reporting, it is very di¢ cult to draw inferences about a …rm's productivity in supplying any one of its products. The …rm can "allocate" the fraudulent information among the di¤erent segments and generate a signi…cant accounting fraud using a large number of small frauds. 34 In terms of Equation (7), this analysis is equivalent to assuming that 2 " ! 1. In this case, accounting signals do not provide information about .
The informativeness of …nancial statements depends on whether the information contained in them refers to marginal cost or average cost. The model assumes that the market can observe the marginal cost. There are some cases in which the average cost and marginal cost are the same (e.g., …xed marginal cost with no …xed cost) and other cases where it is su¢ cient to observe changes to the average cost to infer changes in the marginal cost. The important condition regarding the available information is that market participants should be able to observe changes (or changes relative to competitors) to the cost variable used in pricing decisions.
Competition:
The third condition requires the fraudulent …rm to be part of a competitive industry. The demand for other products cannot be independent of the price and output of the fraudulent …rm. This requirement is necessary because the demand curve is not stationary over time and is not easily observable. A monopoly can claim to be more e¢ cient than it is without changing the way it behaves. It can simply claim that the demand curve shifted in a way that forced it to make its output/price decisions. Since the demand curve is not easily observable and it varies over time, the management can justify almost any action it chooses to take. In this case the model will hold only if the demand is observable because only then can the market infer the optimal prices and output.
Additional Considerations 4.2.1 Allowing Managers to Avoid Detection
Assumption 2 in the paper generates the result that accounting fraud is always detected. It is possible to relax this assumption to reach a di¤erent equilibrium in which the managers might not be caught. In particular, assume that at period T + 1, the market receives a noisy signal about the true pro…tability of the …rm. Let F = P T t=1 DF 1;t and = P T t=1 1;t . In addition, let D = + , where N 0; 2 , denote the signal of the …rm's true pro…ts. For instance, D can be some form of cash ‡ow measure. Assume that the probability of discovering the fraud at period T + 1, T +1 , is a decreasing function of D, i.e., @ T +1 =@D < 0. Intuitively, this assumption means that when investors observe a high signal of true pro…tability, they become less suspicious of the …rm's pro…ts.
In other words, a higher signal reduces the concern that the managers have overstated the pro…ts.
These assumptions would not a¤ect the implications of the theory regarding the e¤ects of fraud on product markets. However, the incentives to commit fraud are a¤ected by the possibility of not getting caught. Given the assumptions above, the manager might avoid being penalized. Therefore, in order to prevent fraud it is necessary to increase the penalty. Speci…cally, the minimum penalty necessary to prevent fraud, k , is given by
Since 0 < T +1 < 1, k > k .
Quantity Competition
This paper follows the case of WC. Since the market was engaged in what seems to be a "price war"
during the fraud period, the paper chose the price-taking competition as an appropriate competition model. In fact, the results are consistent with the chosen model in that the fraudulent …rm is worse o¤ and its competitors do not seem to incur such high costs. However, the e¤ects of …nancial fraud varies with respect to the competitive game. For example, in Cournot, the fraudulent …rm may actually bene…t from the fraud at the expense of its competitors. Sadka (2006) develops the model presented in this paper with two major di¤erences in the assumptions. First, the model assumes a Cournot (quantity) competition instead of price-taking competition. Second, for simplicity, the model assumes that the marginal cost is constant, i.e.,
In the case of fraud, the …rm reports a lower marginal cost. For brevity, I will only discuss the key di¤erences between the model under Cournot competition compared to price-taking competition.
As in the case with price-taking competition, the quantity decision made by the …rm engaging in fraud must be consistent with its reports, because one can infer the marginal cost from the quantity choice. Accordingly, the model indicates that prices decline when the …rm reports lower pro…ts. Therefore, consumer welfare increases and competitors' pro…ts decline due to the lower prices. However, unlike the case of price-taking where lowering prices means lowering the price below marginal cost, in a Cournot model, lowering the price does not necessarily suggest that the price will be below the marginal cost of the …rm committing fraud. Therefore, the pro…ts of the fraud …rm can increase compared to the case where the …rm does not commit fraud (which increases the incentives for fraud). The intuition of this result is similar to that of the instability of collusion.
When competitors collude, it is commonly bene…cial to one of the competitors to increase her output assuming other competitors do not change their output. The same intuition applies in the case of Cournot. Since the price is above the marginal cost, a small increase in the output of one …rm will not change prices signi…cantly 35 and will increase the pro…ts of the …rm that increased its output.
Conclusion
This paper develops the theory that …nancial accounting fraud might result in a signi…cant e¤ect on the product market in which the fraudulent …rm competes. Based on the supposition that the …rm's actions and its …nancial statements must be consistent, the model shows that fraud will a¤ect the true pro…tability of the fraudulent …rm, the industry pro…ts, consumer surplus, and social welfare. The paper illustrates that in the case of price-taking competition, pro…tability falls, consumer surplus rises (in the short term), and social welfare decreases. The signs of the e¤ects are dependent on the cost structure, the demand curve, and the competitive game. This paper tests the implications of the theory described above using a US-based example, WorldCom. The evidence is consistent with the implications of the model. It appears as if WC did not act according to its "true" productivity.
This paper deviates from the traditional concerns that arise in the presence of accounting fraud, such as corporate governance problems and other costs in …nancial markets. This paper takes a di¤erent perspective on the e¤ects of fraud. While this e¤ect is not expected to be equivalent in all cases (depending on the industry), it is an important aspect to study. An illustration of the possible cost of fraud as presented in the paper shows that the e¤ects of fraud on the industry can be economically signi…cant and can have a serious adverse e¤ect on the market.
bene…ts of committing fraud. Since we assume a zero discount rate, the expected bene…ts are simply the sum of the period-speci…c expected bene…ts beyond truthful reporting as follows
: : :
The overall expected bene…ts of accounting fraud is "
to get k set the equation above to zero and solve for k:
Proof of Lemma 3. Each …rm solves the following maximization schedule
Use the …rst order conditions and solving for q i to get
Thus, q F 1 = P=2 and q F 2 q F 3 = ::: = q F n = P=2 , where the superscript F denotes the scenario in which the manager of Firm 1 chooses to commit fraud. These results imply that D 1 = P 2 =4 and 2 = P 2 =4 . Use the linear demand curve, P = A BQ, and Q = q 1 + n q 2 , to get
substitute for P and q i in the pro…t function to get The consumer surplus, cs, in the economy is given by (A P ) Q=2. Substitute for P and Q to get
To get cs, P , 1 , and 2 substitute with in equations 13-16.
Proof of Proposition 2. divide Equation (17) by A 2 2 , rearrange the denominator of the …rst argument, F 1 , and take out of the parenthesis in the denominator of the second argument to get 
Rearranging the above equation yields
Since < and n > = , the right hand side is larger than the left-hand side, i.e., DF 
multiply by 4 , and take the square root of both sides (both the right-hand side and the left-hand side are positive) to get
divide by 2A , and take out of the parenthesis in the denominator of the right-hand side to get (2 + B + nB ) _ 1 (2 + B (n + 1))
Multiply both sides by the two denominators to get 2 + nB + B _ 2 + B + nB
and thus, (2) - (5) in millions, as a function of α where A≈313, B≈0.08⋅ 10⁻ ⁶ , n=6, and β =0.00001.
